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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. CITY OF
BIRMINGHAM: ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SCRUTINY OF A NATIVITY SCENE
DISPLAY
During the holiday season governments sometimes expend public
funds to maintain seasonal displays on both public and private property.
One such display is a nativity scene (or creche) which depicts the reli-
gious birth of Christ. The scene traditionally contains figures of Mary,
Joseph, the Christ Child, wise men and barn animals.
The first amendment prohibits governments from making a law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.' In Lynch v. Donnelly, 2 the United States Supreme Court first
considered the constitutionality of a nativity scene displayed by a city in
the context of the Christmas season. The Court held that the publicly
owned nativity scene erected by the city in a private park did not violate
the establishment clause.3 In American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Bir-
mingham,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the city of Birmingham violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment when it displayed a nativity scene on the lawn of city hall
because the scene, displayed without other nonreligious holiday symbols,
had the effect of endorsing religion.
This comment examines the Sixth Circuit's holding in ACLU that a
nativity scene, displayed by a city without other nonreligious symbols,
violates the establishment clause of the first amendment. Part I discusses
the facts and holding of ACLU. Part II traces the United States Supreme
Court's decisions interpreting the establishment clause. Part III argues
that the Sixth Circuit in ACLU misinterpreted the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lynch and explores the legal impact of ACLU. Part IV concludes
that the Sixth Circuit narrowly confined Lynch to its particular facts by
requiring a government display to contain secular symbols to pass consti-
tutional muster.
I. American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham
The city of Birmingham annually displayed a nativity scene on the
lawn of its city hall.5 The nativity scene contained figures of Mary, Jo-
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ......
The establishment clause has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
3 Id. at 687. See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
4 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1986) (No. 86-389).
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari, ACLU remains valid law in the Sixth Circuit.
The Second Circuit has come to an opposite conclusion. See infra notes 18 & 92. The Supreme
Court should ultimately clarify the law regarding the constituitionality of religious displays.
5 791 F.2d at 1562.
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seph, the Christ Child, three shepherds, and several lambs.6 The city
exhibited the scene at city hall from late November through early Janu-
ary.7 The city purchased, displayed, maintained, and stored the creche
with public funds.8 Micki Levin and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), on behalf of residents of the city of Birmingham, brought an
action to enjoin the city from displaying and maintaining the nativity
scene, claiming that the city violated the first amendment.9
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
held that the city of Birmingham violated the establishment clause.' 0
The district court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Lemon v. Kurtzman"I and Lynch. 12 In Lemon, the Supreme Court pro-
posed a three prong test for reviewing establishment clause challenges:
(1) whether the challenged government activity has a secular purpose; (2)
whether the primary effect of the government activity advances or inhib-
its a religion; and (3) whether the activity creates an excessive entangle-
ment of government with religion.' 3 The district court in ACLU,
applying the Lemon test, found that the city failed prong one because it
did not show a secular purpose for the creche.' 4 The court stated that
the city failed prong two since the nativity scene showed "implicit gov-
ernment support" for religion.' 5 Finally, the court found that while the
display did not result in excessive entanglement of the government with
religion, the nativity scene would cause political divisiveness and thus the
city also failed on prong three.' 6 Accordingly, the court granted a per-
manent injunction to prevent the city from "[e]recting, supporting, or
maintaining a nativity scene on the lawn of the Birmingham city hall."'
7
The city of Birmingham appealed the judgment of the district court.
The city, relying on Lynch, stressed that it did not fail the second prong
of Lemon because it did not directly advance religion when it displayed
the creche; it merely included the creche in the celebration of a national
holiday. The city argued that whether it displayed the nativity scene
alone or with other symbols of the Christmas holiday was unimportant.' 8




9 The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). To obtain standing under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a showing of economic injury or injury to specfic individual rights is not necessary. A
party must demonstrate a sufficient personal stake in the controversy to warrant federal court juris-
diction. See, e.g., Suarez v. Administrador Del Deporte de Puerto Rico, 354 F. Supp. 320 (D.P.R.
1972); DeJesus v. Ward, 441 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
10 588 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
11 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12 465 U.S. 668.
13 See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
14 588 F. Supp. at 1339.
15 Id.
16 Id
17 d at 1340.
18 Id See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub. nom,
Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (a city did not violate the establishment
clause when it maintained a creche on private property which was not displayed with secular sym-
bols). See infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
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display a nativity scene because the scene was only one part of a much
larger Christmas display which included items unrelated to religion.1 9
The ACLU asserted that the city of Birmingham's nativity scene which
the city displayed without any secular symbols of the Christmas holiday
"send[s] an unmistakable signal to observers that the city officially en-
dorses the religion Christianity."
20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the district court. The court held that while the district
court erred in applying prongs one and three of the Lemon test,21 the
listrict court correctly found the display's primary effect advanced Chris-
tianity and thus the city violated the second prong.22
Applying the first prong, the Sixth Circuit noted that although the
creche did have some religious significance in promoting the holiday
spirit of joy and goodwill, it had a secular purpose. 23 The court ex-
plained that Lynch does not require a totally secular purpose.24 Thus, the
court concluded that the record did not support a finding that the city's
actual purpose was to endorse religion. In reversing the district court's
finding on the third prong that the display caused excessive administra-
tive entanglement with religion, the court stated that, other than from
the present parties, no other parties registered complaints about the
creche and the display involved no church or religious entity.25 To sup-
port its finding, the court, interpreting Lynch, stated: "In the absence of
excessive political entanglement fostered by the challenged governmen-
tal action, political divisiveness alone cannot render otherwise permissi-
ble official conduct invalid."
26
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the nativity
scene had the effect of advancing the Christian religion.2 7 The court dis-
tinguished Lynch, stating that:
When surrounded by a multitude of secular symbols of Christmas a
nativity scene may do no more than remind an observer that the holi-
day has a religious origin. But when the nonreligious trappings-ac-
cretions of the centuries-are stripped away there remains only the
universally recognized symbol for the central affirmation of a single
religion-Christianity.
28
The court held that the unadorned creche on the lawn of city hall consti-
tuted a purely religious symbol, explaining that the Birmingham display
called attention to a single aspect of the Christmas holiday-its religious
origins. 29 The court found that the creche conveyed a message that the
city endorsed Christianity and thus failed the "effects" prong of the
19 ACLU, 791 F.2d at 1564.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1565.
22 Id. at 1567.
23 Id. at 1565.
24 Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681).
25 791 F.2d at 1565.
26 Id. (construing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 682).
27 791 F.2d at 1566-67.
28 Id. at 1566.
29 Id. at 1566-67.
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Lemon test. With these findings, a divided appellate court affirmed the
district court's injunction preventing the city from displaying the nativity
scene.
Judge Nelson, in dissent, commented that the court implicitly
adopted a "St. Nicholas too" test.3 0 Judge Nelson suggested that the
majority incorrectly interpreted Lynch to permit a city to display a nativity
scene only if the creche was a part of a larger display which contained
secular symbols of Christmas. In noting this, Judge Nelson stated that "a
city can get by with displaying a creche if it throws in a sleigh full of toys
and a Santa Claus, too." 3' Judge Nelson suggested that the majority's
holding will be difficult to apply because a city or court must determine
how many secular symbols would render a display constitutional. The
dissent also criticized the majority for ignoring the traditional precedents
which have accommodated religion.3 2 For these reasons, Judge Nelson
concluded that the majority erred in holding that the city of Birmingham
violated the establishment clause.
II. The Development of Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis
A. Early Development
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion. . . ,,13 The framers intended the
establishment clause to constrain the federal government from establish-
ing a particular national church.3 4 Initially, the establishment clause did
not apply to states, and consequently, five states had established
churches at the time the Constitution was ratified.3 5 The United States
Supreme Court has applied several approaches to establishment clause
analysis, ranging from absolutist to accommodationist. The absolutist
approach prohibits governments from preferring one religion over an-
other or religion over nonreligion.3 6 The accommodationist approach
30 Id at 1569.
31 Id
32 Id at 1568. The dissent gave examples of how the nation has historically accommodated
religion: (1) the government has sold postage stamps depicting Mary and the infantJesus; (2) the
government hires chaplains for the armed forces, prisons, and Congress; (3) the national currency
bears the motto "In God We Trust;" and (4) Congress enacted Christmas as a legal holiday. Id. at
1570.
33 U.S. CONST., amend. I.
34 Joseph Story wrote: "The real difficulty [in first amendment analysis] lies in ascertaining lim-
its to which government may rightfully go in fostering and encouraging religion." 2J. STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrrTrON OF THE UNITED STATES § 1872 (2d ed. 1891). Although Story
interpreted the establishment clause as merely prohibiting discrimination among Christian religions,
recently the Supreme Court has interpreted Story as viewing the first amendment as a protection
against an establishment of a particular national church. Lynch 465 U.S. at 678. See T. COOLEY,
CONsTrruTroNAL LIMrATIONS 470-471 (1868) ("The American constitutions contain no provision
which prohibit the authorities from ... solemn recognition of a superintending Providence in public
transactions [as long as] ... care be taken to avoid discrimination in favor of one denomination or
sect.").
35 Georgia, South Carolina, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Hampshire had -established
churches when the Constitution was ratified.
36 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. See supra note I and infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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prohibits government support for one religious sect over another.3 7 The
absolutist approach demands complete separation of church and state,
while the accommodationist approach permits neutral government sup-
port for religion as a whole.
In Everson v. Board of Education,38 the United States Supreme Court,
for the first time, thoroughly examined the establishment clause. The
Court applied an absolutist approach.39 The Court, quoting Thomas Jef-
ferson, stated that the establishment clause was intended to erect a "wall
of separation between church and state."
40
In McCollum v. Board of Education,4' the Court also applied the abso-
lutist approach. It noted, however, that the establishment clause does
not require hostility towards religion or religious teachings because it
would conflict with our national tradition as embodied in the free exer-
cise clause.4
2
The Supreme Court in Zorach v. Clauson43 shifted its position and
adopted the accommodationist approach. The Court upheld a statute
which allowed students, at their parents' request, to attend religious serv-
ices at a religious center during school hours. The Court stated that the
statute accommodated sectarian needs, following the best of American
traditions, by respecting the religious nature of citizens.44 To do other-
wise, the Court warned, would show the government had a callous indif-
ference to religious groups and preferred nonreligious persons.
45
B. The Lemon Test
The United States Supreme Court returned to the absolutist posi-
tion in the decade following Zorach.46 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,47 the Court,
utilizing the policies behind the absolutist approach, set forth a three
prong test to determine whether a particular government activity violates
the establishment clause.48 The Lemon test inquires into: (1) whether the
challenged government activity has a secular purpose;49 (2) whether the
37 See Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
185, 187 (1985).
38 330 U.S. I (state statute authorizing school boards to finance transportation of school chil-
dren to private religious schools did not violate the establishment clause).
39 Id. at 15.
40 Id. at 16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
41 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (Illinois statute that permitted pupils to attend a religious class of their
choice violated the establishment clause).
42 Id. at 211-12.
43 343 U.S. 306 (1952). See Note, supra note 37, at 188. Cf. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (the first
amendment requires states to be neutral).
44 343 U.S. at 314. The Court listed examples of government conduct considered within the
boundaries of the first amendment, including prayer in Congress and legislative enactment of
Thanksgiving as a holiday. Id. at 312.
45 Id.
46 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidated state law prescribing official prayer in
public schools); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidated state law re-
quiring Bible reading in public schools).
47 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
48 See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
49 403 U.S. at 612. See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (validated Sunday closing law on grounds that its secular goal was to
protect health and safety). A government activity that is motivated partially by a religious purpose
[Vol. 62:114
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primary effect of the government activity advances or inhibits a reli-
gion;50 and (3) whether the activity creates an excessive entanglement of
government with religion.5 1 If an activity fails on any prong, it is uncon-
stitutional.5 2 The Court stated that the policy supporting the three pro-
nged test is to avoid political division along religious lines-"one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect."
5 3
In Lemon, a Rhode Island statute gave teachers of secular subjects in
some nonpublic schools a fifteen percent salary supplement.54 A second
statute from Pennsylvania provided direct aid to elementary and secon-
dary private schools for teaching secular subjects. 55
The Court, applying the first prong of the Lemon test, found that
since both statutes were intended to enhance the quality of secular edu-
cation in all schools covered by compulsory attendance laws, the statutes
did not lack a secular purpose.5 6 The Court, applying the "effects"
prong, initially found that the activity had the effect of advancing reli-
gion. The Court, however, recognized that other restrictive factors ex-
isted that may have negated that finding.5 7 Thus, the Court declined to
make a determination under the effects prong since the statutes failed
under the third prong.
The Court, applying the third prong, determined that the substan-
tially religious character of the church related schools would produce a
church-state entanglement of the type the establishment clause was
designed to avoid.58 The Court stated that, since parochial school teach-
ers are subject to the direction of religious authorities, the states would
have had to supervise school operations to verify that teachers did not
inculcate religion which would create an enduring relationship between
may satisfy the first prong of Lemon if it is not motivated by a purpose to advance religion. See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490 (1985).
50 403 U.S. at 612. This is referred to as the "effects" prong. Those government actions which
have a "direct and immediate effect" of advancing religion violate the establishment clause, while
those which have an "indirect, remote, and incidental effect do not." See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683
(citing Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)).
51 403 U.S. at 613. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upheld government
grants exempting from tax property used for religious purposes).
52 403 U.S. at 612. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 77 (1983) (upheld a Minnesota statute which
allowed state taxpayers to deduct expenses for tuition, textbooks and transportation for children
attending elementary or secondary schools); Larkin v. Grendels Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (in-
validated a Massachusetts statute allowing schools and churches to prevent the issuance of liquor
licenses to premises within a five hundred foot radius of the church or school); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980) (struck down a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Com-
mandments on the walls of each public school classroom in the state on the grounds that the statute
had a preeminently religious purpose); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious iberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidated amendments to New York's education and tax laws, establishing
financial aid programs for qualified nonpublic schools and prohibiting tuition reimbursement for
parents of children attending nonqualifying schools, because they violated the second prong).
53 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. See also Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1680,
1692 (1969).
54 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-609.
55 Id at 609-11.
56 Id. at 613.
57 Id
58 Id. at 616.
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church and state.59 Additionally, the statutes produced entanglement by
requiring the states to examine school records in order to determine how
much of the total expenditure was attributable to secular education as
opposed to religious activity. 60 Finally, the Court found the state pro-
grams presented a divisive political potential because the amount of aid
the states directed to the private schools could have become an issue in
an election campaign. 6 1 The Supreme Court explained that the potential
divisiveness of church-state entanglement is a threat to the normal polit-
ical process. 62 Moreover, the Court noted that while some entanglement
between church and state is inevitable, lines must be drawn to prevent
the de facto establishment of religion.63 Thus, the Court held that the
two statutes violated the establishment clause.
C. The Lemon Test Applied to a Nativity Scene
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 64 the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to
consider the constitutionality of a nativity scene displayed by a city in the
context of the Christmas season. The Court modified the Lemon test by
incorporating the accommodationist approach. The Court held that the
city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island did not violate the establishment clause
when it erected a creche in the context of its annual Christmas
celebration.
The city displayed the creche in a private park located in the heart of
a shopping district.65 The creche consisted of life sized figures tradition-
ally present in the Christian story of Christ's birth. The city displayed the
creche along with a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner
labeled "Season's Greetings." 66 The creche had been part of the city's
annual display for more than forty years.67 Some members of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union brought an action to enjoin the city from dis-
playing the creche, alleging that the city, by including the creche in the
display, supported Christianity and thus violated the establishment
clause. 68 A district court upheld the challenge, enjoining the city from
including the creche in the display, and the Court of Appeals for the First
59 Id. at 616-19.
60 Id. at 620.
61 Id. at 622-24.
62 Id. at 622.
63 Id. at 625.
64 465 U.S. 668 (1984). For discussion of the establishment clause and Lynch, see Cox, The
Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1175
(1984); Crabb, Religious Symbols, American Traditions and the Constitution, 1984 B.Y.U.L. REv. 509; Dor-
sen and Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An Error ofJudgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 837; Long, Does the
Wall Still Stand?: Separation of Church and State in the United States, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 755 (1985);
Leading Cases of the 1983 Term-Constitutional Law: Establishment of Religion, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87
(1984); Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REv.
185 (1985); Comment, Lynch v. Donnelly: Supreme Court Approval of Publicly Sponsored Nativity Scene
Displays Establishes an Unholy Alliance Between Church and State, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 103 (1984).
65 465 U.S. at 671.
66 The Pawtucket display included reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy striped poles, carolers,
cut-out figures of a clown, an elephant, a robot, and hundreds of colored lights. The city owned all
components of the display. Id.
67 Id.




The Supreme Court, returning to an accommodationist position,
modified the second prong of the Lemon test by considering cases and
statutes which have traditionally accommodated religion. The Court
stated that "[the Constitution] affirmatively mandates accommodation,
not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."
'70
The Court rejected the dictum in Everson v. Board of Education that "an
impregnable wall of separation" exists between church and state, in favor
of a position which allows governments to accommodate religion.
71
After finding that the creche had a secular purpose 72 and did not
create excessive entanglement with religion, 7" the Court modified the
second prong of the Lemon test, the effects prong, by considering govern-
ment activities which have traditionally accommodated the religious heri-
tage of the United States. The Court listed examples of governmental
activity which have survived constitutional challenge although having the
indirect effect of advancing religion: Sunday dosing laws;74 programs
allowing students to be excused for religious instruction during school
hours; 75 legislative prayers; 76 expenditure of funds allocated for text-
books; 77 transportation provided to students attending church spon-
sored schools; 78 federal grants given to church sponsored colleges and
universities; 79 and tax exemptions for church properties.80 The Court
stated that the nativity scene did not advance religion any more than
these traditional precedents.8 ' The Court characterized the display as a
"passive symbol" with the primary effect of depicting the origins of
Christmas.8 2 The Court's rationale for modifying the "effects" prong
was that focusing exclusively on the religious component of any activity
69 465 U.S. at 672. See 691 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir. 1982).
70 465 U.S. at 673. The Lynch majority, prior to discussing Lemon, set forth the accommodation-
ist approach. It appears, however, that the Court applied this approach only under the second prong
of the Lemon test. It is unclear what effect the accommodationist approach will have on the first and
third prongs.
71 330 U.S. at 18. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
72 Applying the first prong of Lemon, the Court stated that it will invalidate governmental action
on grounds that a secular purpose is lacking only when the activity is motivated solely by religious
considerations. The Lynch Court determined the creche did serve a secular purpose because it ena-
bled the city to celebrate and depict the origins of Christmas. See 465 U.S. at 680-81.
73 Applying the third prong of the Lemon test, the Court noted that entanglement is a question of
kind and degree. The Court found no excessive administrative entanglement, stating that no evi-
dence was presented of contact with church authorities concerning the content, design, or mainte-
nance of the exhibit prior to or after Pawtucket purchased the creche. Additionally, the Court noted
that, apart from this lawsuit, no evidence existed of any political friction over the creche in the forty-
year history of Pawtucket's Christmas celebration. Thus, the Court stated that political divisiveness
alone cannot serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct. Id at 684.
74 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
75 Zorach, 343 U.S. 306. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
76 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
77 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
78 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
79 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (construction grants to sectarian colleges); Roemer
v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (noncategorical grants to sectarian colleges and
universities).
80 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
81 465 U.S. at 681-82.
82 Id at 685.
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would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the establishment clause.83
The Court held the only benefit which the creche conferred on Christian-
ity was indirect, remote, and incidental, and thus not unconstitutional.
8 4
III. Analysis of ACLU
A. The Sixth Circuit's Misinterpretation of Lynch
In ACLU, the Sixth Circuit found that the city of Birmingham's dis-
play had the effect of endorsing the Christian religion and thus was un-
constitutional since it violated the second prong of the Lemon test. The
ACLU court interpreted Lynch as holding that a city could display a
creche only if the city accompanied the creche with other secular sym-
bols.8 5 Thus, the court held the city of Birmingham violated the estab-
lishment clause when it displayed a nativity scene on the front lawn of
city hall without displaying additional secular symbols.
8 6
The Sixth Circuit in ACLU misinterpreted the majority's holding in
Lynch for two reasons. First, Lynch requires courts to consider the degree
to which the government activity benefits religion under the effects
prong of Lemon.87 The Lynch Court, modifying the second prong of
Lemon, found that the creche benefited religion no more than those activ-
ities traditionally upheld by the Court.88 The Sixth Circuit in ACLU
failed to consider traditional precedents when it applied the second
prong of Lemon. The court should have inquired into whether the
creche, displayed without secular symbols, benefited religion anymore
than those types of government activity traditionally permitted.
Second, Lynch requires courts, when examining the constitutionality
of a nativity scene, to consider the full context of the government activity.
Focusing exclusively on the religious component of any activity inevitably
leads to its invalidation.8 9 Courts must consider a nativity scene in the
context of the Christmas season and not consider the physical context of
the creche. 90 The Supreme Court in Lynch noted that a nativity scene has
traditionally been used to depict the historical origins of Christmas.9'
In McCreary v. Stone,92 the Second Circuit correctly recognized the
83 Id. at 680.
84 Id. at 683.
85 ACLU, 791 F.2d at 1566.
86 Id. at 1567.
87 465 U.S. at 684.
88 Id. at 681-82.
89 Id. at 680.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 686.
92 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub. nom., Board of Trustees v.
McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985). In McCreary, a civic group sought to display a creche in a public
park during the holiday season. The Second Circuit held that the neutral accommodation of the
creche in a public forum was not a violation of the establishment clause. ME at 729. The court
applied the Lemon test. First, the court reasoned that the open forum policy, which allowed access to
the park for both religious and nonreligious speech, constituted a secular purpose. Second, the
court considered the Lynch analysis under the primary effects prong and found that the physical
context within which the display of the creche was situated did not impermissibly advance religion.
Third, the court found that the creche did not foster entanglement with religion because the city did
not continuously monitor the display.
[Vol. 62:114
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Lynch majority's directive to consider the creche in the context of the
Christmas season.93 The Second Circuit stated: "The Supreme Court
did not decide the Pawtucket case [Lynch] based on the physical context
within which the display of the creche was situated; rather, the Court
consistently referred to the creche 'in the context of the Christmas
season.' "94
The Sixth Circuit in ACLU recognized the Lynch directive,95 yet the
court failed to apply it.96 In finding that the creche violated the establish-
ment clause, the court in ACLU focused exclusively on the religious as-
pect of the creche when it considered the physical context of the creche,
rather than on the setting of the Christmas season.97 In Lynch, the
Supreme Court neither stated nor suggested that the presence of secular
symbols in the Pawtucket display somehow legitimized an otherwise un-
constitutional display. Since the Supreme Court allowed a city to display
a nativity scene with secular symbols, why would one without such sym-
bols be unconstitutional? 98 The endorsement of religion is the same in
either case. Because Lynch did not contain language suggesting that the
inclusion of secular symbols purified the Pawtucket display, the Sixth Cir-
cuit in ACLU should not have found that the absence of secular symbols
rendered the Birmingham display unconstitutional under the effects
prong of Lemon.
B. Impact of ACLU
The Sixth Circuit in A CL U interpreted Lynch to require the inclusion
of additional secular symbols to withstand an establishment clause chal-
lenge. The ACLU majority has adopted an absolutist approach because
any act or symbol with religious significance displayed alone has the di-
rect effect of advancing religion. Once a government engages in such
activity it can either add secular symbols or cease the activity. Judge Nel-
son's dissent in ACLU addressed the problems with the majority's rea-
soning.99 Judge Nelson recognized that the court's logic dictated" 'A St.
93 Id. at 729.
94 Id
95 ACLU, 791 F.2d at 1566.
96 Id. at 1566-67.
97 On the four occasions that the panel cited Lynch as authority, three of the citations referred to
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit seized upon justice O'Connor's
passing references to the creche's physical context, ignoring the thrust ofJustice O'Connor's argu-
ment. Justice O'Connor stated, "The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has endorsed
Christianity by its display of the creche." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor went on to state that "[t]he display serves a secular purpose--celebration of a public
holiday with traditional symbols." Id. at 693. Thus, Justice O'Connor analyzed the creche in the
context of the traditional Christmas season. See generally Beschle, The Conservative as Liberab The Reli-
gion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach ofJustice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 150 (1987).
98 See ACLU, 791 F.2d at 1567 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 1569. The physical context argument presents logical difficulties in addition to the
"Santa Claus too" dilemma. For example, may a city display an unadorned creche in one locality, if
it also maintains secular seasonal displays in other parts of the city? How physically proximate to the
creche must the secular display stand? The physical context classification is artifical and only invites
frivolous litigation. The more cogent reading of Lynch, including both the majority and concurring
opinions, focuses on the creche in the context of the Christmas season. Such analysis will avoid
litigation over a matter of a few feet and provide courts with clear guidelines.
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Nicholas too test'-[that is] a city can get by displaying a creche if it
throws in a sleigh full of toys and a Santa Claus, too."'10 0 The problem
with the majority's holding is that a city will have difficulty determining
how many secular symbols are necessary to have a constitutional display.
By narrowly construing the effects prong of the Lemon test to pro-
hibit any government activity which has the appearance of benefitting
religion, the Sixth Circuit's holding would also require courts to invali-
date various activities which currently appear to benefit religion in gen-
eral or one particular faith. 10 1 For example, governments would have to
remove religious paintings from the National Gallery10 2 and censor pub-
lic school literature, history books and art. Moreover, courts would have
to declare congressional acts unconstitutional which employ chaplains
for the armed forces, prisons and Congress,10 3 recognize Christmas as a
national holiday,' 04 and proclaim "In God We Trust" as the country's
national motto.' 05
IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court rejected the absolutist approach in favor of an
accommodationist approach which seeks to determine whether the chal-
lenged conduct, in reality, tends to establish a religion. Lynch requires a
modification of the effects prong of the Lemon test by applying traditional
precedential analysis. Additionally, Lynch requires that a court consider a
creche in the context of the Christmas season. The ACLU court incor-
rectly interpreted Lynch because it focused exclusively on the religious
aspect of the creche absent additional secular symbols. The court in
ACLU did not modify its Lemon "effects" analysis with traditional factors
or consider the creche in the context of the Christmas season. The con-







101 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.
102 More than 200 paintings depicting religious messages are regularly exhibited in Washington.
Id. at 677 n.4.
103 2 U.S.C. §§ 61d & 84-2 (1982) (compensation for congressional chaplains); Exec. Order No.
12396, 47 Fed. Reg. 55897 (1982), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 301 note (1982) (delegation of Presidential
authority to Secretary of Defense to appoint chaplains). See also 32 C.F.R. § 65 (1985) (nomination
of chaplains for military service).
104 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982) (declaring Christmas day as a legal holiday). The Lynch majority
stated that the creche was no more an advancement of religion than Christmas as a national holiday.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683. It follows that if the creche constitutes a violation of the establishment
clause, Christmas as a legal holiday would likewise violate the Constitution.
105 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1982) (declaring national motto "In God We Trust"). See also 31 U.S.C.
§ 5112 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 396, 3, 24 Stat. 635) (authorizing
placement of motto on currency).
106 See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NoRTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTIVE AS-
SOCIATION V. PETERSON: INDIAN RELIGIOUS SITES PREVAIL OVER PUBLIC
LAND DEVELOPMENT
The first amendment prohibits the government from imposing bur-
dens upon the free exercise of religion.' While religious beliefs are pro-
tected absolutely,2 the courts have restricted religious practices where
governmental interests are overriding.3 In one class of free exercise
cases, the federal courts have evaluated the claims of North American
Indians4 whose sacred sites are located upon public lands slated for de-
velopment by the federal government.5 To evaluate the Natives' claims,
the courts have used a centrality test6 as well as the traditional free exer-
cise test.7 In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson,8 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the gov-
ernmental interests in a proposed land development project did not jus-
tify the burden imposed on the Native Americans' free exercise rights.
Peterson represents the first federal circuit court case in which the Indians'
interests have prevailed. 9 Because the court, however, required a show-
ing of the centrality of the Natives' religious practices, 10 Peterson may not
indicate a breakthrough for Native American religious rights.
This comment examines the Peterson decision. Part I sets forth the
facts and holding of Peterson. Part II outlines the traditional analysis of
free exercise claims. Part III then examines how the courts have applied
the free exercise clause to Indian claims in cases concerning public land.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the Peterson holding in light of previous free ex-
ercise decisions, and Part V concludes that due to the Peterson court's
limited definition of a protectible religious practice, the decision does
not further Native religious interests.
I. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson
In Peterson, seven nonprofit associations, four American Indians, and
two Sierra Club members brought suit to enjoin the United States Forest
Service from constructing a stretch of road and allowing timber harvest-
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
2 See infra note 100.
3 See infra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
4 The following terms will be used interchangeably in this comment: "North American Indi-
ans," "Indians," "Natives," and "Native Americans."
5 See, e.g., Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.
1986); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Badoni v. Higgin-
son, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir,), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785
(D.S.D. 1982), aft'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
6 See infra notes 96-101 & 113-139 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 45-112 and accompanying text.
8 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
9 See supra note 5. See also infra notes 118-129 & 140-149 and accompanying text.
10 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 691.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ing in the Blue Creek Unit of the Six Rivers National Forest." Three
tribes of Indians used an area within the Unit for religious purposes.
12
The plaintiffs argued that the projects would impair the Natives' use of
the area thus imposing undue burdens on the Indian plaintiffs' free exer-
cise rights.1
3
The Blue Creek Unit lies in the Siskiyou Mountains of Northern Cal-
ifornia, located in the Six Rivers National Forest. The Blue Creek Unit
contains an area known as the "high country." The Yurok, Karok, and
Tolowa Indians, who live in the surrounding region, use specific sites
within the high country for prayer and religious purposes. 14 In addition,
the Native Americans consider the entire area of the high country sacred
and the sole source of spiritual power for the Native healers and religious
leaders, permitting them to fill roles central to the religions. 15 The reli-
gious use of the high country depends on its pristine nature.
16
The United States Forest Service, headed by R. Max Peterson, man-
ages the Six Rivers National Forest.'7 In 1981, the Forest Service pro-
posed permitting timber harvesting in the Blue Creek Unit, including
part of the high country.' 8 In 1982, the Forest Service proposed the con-
struction of a 6.02 mile stretch of the Gasquet-Orleans (G-O) road
through the high country.' 9 The plaintiffs objected to the proposed
projects and exhausted their administrative remedies.20 The plaintiffs
then filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California to halt the proposed development.2 1 Their com-
plaint alleged, inter alia, that the decisions to construct the road and to
allow timber harvesting in the Blue Creek Unit violated the first amend-
ment of the Constitution, because the projects would violate the sacred
qualities of the area and impair its successful use for religious pur-
poses.2 2 The Natives claimed these actions would impose undue bur-
dens on their free exercise rights.23 The defendants conceded that the
Indians' use of the high country deserved first amendment protection.
2 4
11 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
12 Id. at 591.
13 Id. at 592.
14 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 690.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 692.
17 Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 590.
18 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 690.
19 Id. This was the last section to be completed of a paved road from Gasquet, California to
Orleans, California.
20 Id. The plaintiffs appealed the Forest Supervisor's selection of a timber harvesting plan to the
Regional Forester. The Regional Forester denied the appeal, and the plaintiffs appealed that deci-
sion to the Chief of the Forest Service. Brief for Appellant at 7, Northwest Indian Cementery Protec-
tive Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986). The Chief denied the appeal and directed
implementation of the plan. Id. at 8.
After the Regional Forester adopted a plan for the construction of the 6.02 mile stretch of the
G-O road, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Chief of the Forest Service. The Chief denied
the appeal and affirmed the decision. Id. at 10. Subsequently, the Secretary of Agriculture issued a
memorandum refusing further review of the Chief of the Forest Service. Id.
21 Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 590.
22 Id. at 592.




However, the defendants claimed that overriding governmental interests
supported the development.
25
The district court found that the Indians' use of the high country was
central and indispensable to the Indian plaintiffs' religion 26 and that the
proposed development would interfere with the Native plaintiffs' free ex-
ercise rights. 27 Additionally, the district court ruled that the interests of
the Forest Service either would not be served by the proposed projects
or did not constitute the paramount interests necessary to justify in-
fringement of the plaintiffs' freedom of religion. 28 Therefore, the district
court held that the Forest Service decisions violated the first amend-
ment.29 The district court issued an injunction preventing the construc-
tion of the road and any timber harvesting in the high country.30 The
government appealed.
31
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made a de
novo review of whether the Indian plaintiffs had a valid first amendment
claim.3 2 The court began the analysis of the facts by setting forth its view
of the two prong test as developed by other courts in the prior Native
American land-claim free exercise cases.33 According to the court, the
Natives bore the initial burden of demonstrating that the construction of
the G-O road would create a burden on their rights.3 4 To demonstrate a
25 Defendants assert that construction... of the G-O road would (1) increase the quantity
of timber accessible to harvesting in the Blue Creek Unit; (2) stimulate employment in the
regional timber industry; (3) provide recreational access to the Blue Creek Unit as well as
permit through recreational traffic on the G-O road; (4) further the efficient administration
of Six Rivers National Forest by the Forest Service; and (5) increase the price of bids on
future timber sales in the Orleans area of the... National Forest by decreasing the cost of
hauling such timber to timber mills ....
Id at 595.
26 Id at 594. The district court relied heavily upon a report prepared at the request of the
Forest Service by Dr. Dorothea Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section, Gas-
quet-Orleans Road, Six Rivers National Forest (1979). This report identified the indirect and direct
adverse impact which construction of the road would have on the spiritual and physical well-being of
the Indians living nearby. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 591-92.
27 The district court found that construction and timber harvesting would damage the salient
qualities of the high country. Such intrusion could destroy the core of Northwest Indian religious
beliefs and practices. Id. at 594.
28 The construction of the road would not improve access to timber in the Blue Creek Unit and
would not increase jobs. The increased recreational access, in addition, was insufficient to support
infringement of first amendment rights. The district court found that the Forest Service administra-
tion already operated efficiently, and the increase in competition for timber was too speculative and
did not constitute a paramount interest. Id at 595.
29 Id. at 597.
30 Id. at 606.
31 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 691. While appeal was pending, Congress enacted the California Wilder-
ness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) The
Act placed most of the high country out of the reach of logging. The Act left open, however, a 1200
foot-wide corridor for completion of the G-O road. Id, 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. III 1985). Con-
gress did not take any position on whether the road should be completed. See H.R. REP. No. 40,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1984); S. REP. No. 582, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1984).
The appeal was submitted and arguedJuly 9, 1984, and decidedJune 24, 1985. The appellants
petitioned for rehearing. The court withdrew its decision, granted a rehearing, and rendered a deci-
sion on July 22, 1986.
32 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 691 n.3.
33 Id. at 691. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
34 Id. at 691-92 (citing School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Note that with the passage of the
California Wilderness Act of 1984 the area at issue was limited to the proposed route of the G-O
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burden, the Indians had to prove three things: (1) that they used the
high country for religious purposes and considered the area sacred; (2)
that the high country was central and indispensible to the beliefs and
practice of their religion; and (3) that the proposed actions would impair
or seriously interfere with those practices.3 5
A review of the district court findings convinced the court that the G-
O road, if built, would burden the Indians' free exercise rights.38 The
court rejected the government's contention that the free exercise clause
could not be violated unless the governmental activity penalized the Na-
tive Americans' religious beliefs or practices. Instead, the court stated
that any governmental activity which makes the exercise of first amend-
ment rights more difficult or which impedes religious observance would
be invalid, even if the burden created was only indirect.37
The majority distinguished Bowen v. Roy, 38 a case decided shortly
road plus small parcels of the high country which were not declared wilderness areas and therefore
possibly subject to timbering. See supra note 31.
35 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 692 (citing Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 742-44 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 956 (1983); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); and Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 792 (D.S.D. 1982), af'd, 706 F.2d
856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983)).
36 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693. The court accepted the district court's findings that the high country
was the location of rituals "central and indispensable" to the Indians' religion; that the pristine
environment of the high country made religious experiences possible; that the proposed road would
seriously damage the qualities which made the high country sacred to the Indians and would be
inconsistent with the Indians' religious practices; and that a significant number of Indian healers and
religious believers considered the high country the source of the spiritual power which allowed them
to fill central traditional Indian religious roles. Id. at 692-93. See also infra notes 61-63 and accompa-
nying text for the test the court applied.
37 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Scott v. Rosen-
berg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984)).
38 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986). In Bowen, two parents of an Indian child applied for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children benefits. They refused to comply with the statute requiring that they pro-
vide the state welfare agency with their daughter's social security number on the grounds that doing
so would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The parents challenged the constitutional-
ity of this requirement under the free exercise clause, objecting that the use of their daughter's
number might harm her spirit. The Court rejected this claim stating:
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the
government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiri-
tual development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be
understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that com-
port with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.
106 S. Ct. at 2152 (emphasis in original).
More troublesome to the Indian plaintiffs in a public land case, however, is a modification on the
second prong of the Yoder test proposed by ChiefJustice Burger in a plurality opinion appended to
the judgment of the Court. Id. at 2153. See also infra note 53 and accompanying text. The Chief
Justice wrote that the Court had "repeatedly" emphasized a distinction between cases involving gov-
ernment compulsion of religion and those which involved government regulation "that indirectly
and incidentally calls for a choice between a governmental benefit and adherence to religious be-
liefs," and concluded that the two types of cases were "slightly different." Id. at 2156. The Chief
Justice then proposed that the nature of the cognizable burden-direct or indirect-"is relevant to
the standard the Government must meet to justify the burden." Id.
This modification was not a part of the holding of Bowen, and at least as many members of the
Court were against it as were for it. It therefore bears little precedential value. If adopted, however,
the modification increases the already heavy burden that Indians must currently bear in a free exer-
cise claim.
See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Mhe Free
Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms
of what the individual can exact from the government.").
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before Peterson, and stated that while the Indians' ability to practice their
religion would virtually be destroyed if the road was built, the plaintiff in
Bowen could continue to practice his religion despite the offense to his
religious sensibilities caused by the government's internal business prac-
tices.3 9 The Natives' claim in the present case therefore properly sought
relief under the free exercise clause, and the second prong of the tradi-
tional balancing test applied.
After determining that any relief granted the Indians would not vio-
late the establishment clause because the injunction merely accommo-
dated, rather than established, the Native Americans' religion,40 the
court evaluated the governmental interests. 4' The court weighed the
level of the government's interest in the construction of the road against
the burden to be placed on the Indians' religious freedom.42 In order to
balance such burdens in its favor, the government had to prove a "para-
mount" or "compelling" interest so as to justify the infringement on the
Indians' constitutional rights.43 Because the government failed to
demonstrate interests sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the balanc-
ing test, the court affirmed the injunction granted by the district court.44
II. The Traditional Free Exercise Test
The first amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
government from establishing or abridging religion.45 In 1940, the
Supreme Court interpreted the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment46 to incorporate the free exercise clause found in the first
amendment.47 Thus, both the federal and state governments must abide
by the free exercise clause.
The Supreme Court developed a two prong balancing test to iden-
39 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693.
40 Id. at 694. The government argued that, if the court allowed the injunction, the Forest Ser-
vice would be administering the high country as a religious shrine for the Indians' benefit. The court
disagreed, noting that the injunction restricted only timber harvesting and road construction in the
high country: "The Forest Service remains free to administer the high country for all other desig-
nated purposes including outdoor recreation, range, watershed, wildlife and fish habitat and wilder-
ness." Id. Nor did the court require the Forest Service to police the conduct of visitors to the high
country to prevent their interference with Indian religious observances. Id- The court also noted
that the injunction was a remedy for a violation of the free exercise clause which the establishment
clause did not bar: "Accommodating the free exercise of religion is a valid purpose of governmental
action, and the promotion of that liberty is a permissible primary effect." Id
41 Id See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
42 Id at 695.
43 In fact, the court agreed with the district court that the government interests shown "fell far
short of constituting the 'paramount interests' necessary tojustify infringement of plaintiffs' freedom
of religion." Id. at 694 (quoting Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 596). The government merely urged the
court to defer to the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior concerning the proper uses of the
high country. The court criticized this argument because it failed to consider the controlling free
exercise standard of a compelling government interest. Id Nor was the court satisfied that the
government was able to show that the same ends could not be accomplished by some less restrictive
means which would place less of a burden on the Indians' religious rights. Id at 695.
44 I d at 698.
45 See supra note 1.
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
47 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that the states are bound by the
free exercise clause).
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tify free exercise violations in two landmark cases.48 In Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,49 the Supreme Court held that South Carolina could not withhold
the benefit of unemployment compensation from the claimant because
she chose to adhere to a religious tenet.50 The Court first concluded that
denial of unemployment compensation infringed upon Sherbert's free
exercise right since she was forced to choose between a benefit and a
religious practice. 51 The Court next found that the state's interest in
preventing potential fraudulent claims did not justify this infringement
on free exercise.
52
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,53 the Supreme Court held that a statute com-
pelling school attendance until age sixteen violated the free exercise
clause as applied to the Amish.54 Addressing the Amish claim of in-
fringement of a free exercise right, the Court initially inquired whether
the tenets were "rooted in religion" 55 and sincerely held.56 The Court
48 Professor Tribe has identified three major policies which underlie the religion clauses: (1) the
protection of voluntary religious beliefs and conduct; (2) the maintenance of government neutrality
towards religion; and (3) the ensurance of separation of church and state. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
sTrrTIONAL LAw § 14-4 at 818-19 (1978). Tribe asserts that thejudicial tests or methods of inquiry
into the free exercise clause draw their rationale from these broad policies. This case comment
limits discussion to the free exercise doctrine.
49 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
50 Id. at 403-06. Because Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, refused to work on Saturday, her
sabbath, she lost herjob. She was unable to find a job not requiring work on Saturday. The South
Carolina Unemployment Commission denied Sherbert unemployment compensation on the basis
that her refusal to take jobs requiring Saturday work was not "good cause" under the Compensation
Act. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the statute placed no restriction upon Sher-
bert's free exercise rights nor did it prevent her from practicing her beliefs. The United States
Supreme Court framed the issue in the form of a balancing test:
If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's
constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary rep-
resents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because
any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a
"compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate ......
Id at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
51 Id. at 404. ("Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon
the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.").
In effect, this quote makes clear that the same test applies to both direct and indirect burden claims.
See also infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
52 Id. at 406-09.
53 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
54 Id. at 234. Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish, declined to send their children,
ages 14 and 15, to school after the eighth grade for religious reasons. By sending their children to
high school, respondents believed that they would have opened themselves up to church censure
and would have endangered the church's, their children's, and their own salvation. They contended
that the high schools taught worldly values (competitiveness, self-distinction, worldly success, and
intellectual and scientific accomplishment) which conflict with Amish religious values (goodness,
community welfare, learning through doing, and separation from society). Pursuant to a complaint
made by the school district administrator for public schools, a Wisconsin county court convicted
respondents of violating the state's compulsory education law and imposed a fine of $5.00 each. Id.
at 208. The statute also provided for imprisonment up to three months for failure to send children
age 7-16 to school. Id. at 207-08 n.2. Experts testified that the Amish religion and way of life were
intertwined and that to separate the children from the community during their adolescence and
expose them to worldly values would endanger the continued existence of the religion. Id at 209-
13. Wisconsin agreed that respondents' beliefs were sincerely held and rooted in religion, but it
argued that the state interest in universal education outweighed respondents' free exercise rights.
Id. at 219.
55 Id. at 215.
56 Id. at 209.
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concluded that the tenet of "be not conformed to this world"5 7 was
rooted in religion and sincerely held.58 Furthermore, the Court found
that the Amish had met their burden of proving the infringement.59 Fi-
nally, the Court balanced the infringement against the state's interest in
universal education. The benefit of less than two more years of school
did not outweigh the threat of secularization of the children, especially
when the children continued to receive a vocational type of education
which prepared them for life in an Amish community.
60
These two cases spawned the traditional two prong test used by
courts to evaluate free exercise claims. First, the individual's religious
beliefs must have been infringed upon.61 Second, if the individual has
established an infringement, the government must show that a "compel-
ling state interest" outweighed the infringement of the free exercise right
in order to prevail 62 and that the "least restrictive means" were used to
accomplish that governmental objective. 63
A. The First Prong: Infringement on Religion
To establish a free exercise violation, the individual first must show
that the practice in question was "rooted in religion," 64 that the belief
was sincerely held,65 and that the government action placed a burden
upon that belief or practice.6 6 Some cases, predominantly those involv-
ing a nontheistic religion, 67 suggest a fourth explicit requirement that the
beliefs and practices be "central" to a bona fide religion.6 8
1. Belief that is Rooted in Religion
Courts have struggled in their attempts to define religion because "a
determination of what is a religious belief or practice entitled to constitu-
57 Romans 12:2 (KingJames).
58 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219. Wisconsin readily conceded these findings. Ide
59 The Court stated:
The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to
worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by sub-
stantially interfering with the religious development of the Amish child and his integration
into the way of life of the Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of develop-
ment, contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the
parent and the child.
Id at 218.
60 Ide at 221-29.
61 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-06; and infra notes 64-101 and accom-
panying text.
62 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403,406-09; and infra notes 102-12 and accom-
panying text.
63 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 ("[I]t would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate
that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amend-
ment rights.") (footnote omitted). See also infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
64 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 and infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
65 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 and infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
66 See supra note 5 and infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
67 A nontheistic belief is a religious belief which does not center around the existence of a god
or gods. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1539 (1976).
68 See infra notes 96-101 & 117-139 and accompanying text.
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tional protection may present a most difficult question. ' 69 It appears
that only in sham claims can the courts comfortably determine which
claims merit first amendment protection.
70
The Supreme Court has avoided defining religion under the first
amendment but has stated what religion is not. In Yoder, the Court stated
that had the Amish claims been based on their subjective or philosophi-
cal evaluation, their claims would not rest on religious belief.7 1 Lower
courts have not been so reluctant. For example, the Third Circuit in Af-
rica v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania72 held that the revolutionary move-
ment known as MOVE was not a religion because it did not address
fundamental and ultimate questions,73 was not comprehensive in nature,
and did not have the defining structural characteristics of other reli-
gions. 74 In either case, the first amendment demands government neu-
trality towards all religions.
75
In United States v. Seeger,76 the Supreme Court attempted to define
the term religion as used in a statute granting exemptions from the mili-
tary draft. 77 The Court compared the importance of a practice in a non-
theistic religion to the importance of God in a theistic religion. This
"parallel" test 78 illustrates an early attempt by the courts to bring non-
theistic religions within the protection accorded to traditional religions.
79
69 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351-61 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result)).
70 Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974) (first amendment does not extend to
so called religions which are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently de-
void of religious sincerity), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp.
439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968) (extrinsic evidence proved that the claim of religion was only a tactical pre-
tense to obtain exemption from federal drug regulations).
71 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. The facts in Yoder do implicate a Supreme Court definition of reli-
gion-the question is which facts, because the Court noted the following: Shared belief by an organ-
ized group, belief related and identified in religious literature, the beliefs pervaded the Amish lives,
and this system of beliefs had existed for over three centuries. Id. at 215-17. For an interesting
discussion on the dichotomy announced in Yoder, see Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitu-
tional Definition of "Religion, " 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983).
72 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982).
73 Fundamental and ultimate questions include questions of right and wrong and life and death.
74 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032-36. See also Women's Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022, 1034
(D. Neb. 1979) ("Whatever else non-theistic religion is, it has at least two essential qualities: tenets
and organization."), aft'd, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1980).
75 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031 ("We must avoid any predisposition toward conventional religions so
that the unfamiliar faiths are not branded mere secular beliefs.").
76 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
77 Seeger did not belong to an orthodox religious sect. The Court held that Seeger's beliefs
took on the meaning of "religion" in the draft statute according to his "own scheme of things." Id
at 185.
78 The Seeger Court defined the test as "whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one
who clearly qualifies for the exemption." Id. at 166. See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
340 (1971).
79 See also Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1063 (1978); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); and Women's Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979),
aff'd, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1980); L. TRIBE, AM ERICAN CONsTrrtnONAL LAW § 14-6 (1978); Boyan,
Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479 (1968); Marcus, The Forum
of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1245; Merel, The
Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI.
L. REv. 805, 831 (1978); and Comment, Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution, and D.A.R., 32 U.
CHI. L. REv. 533, 550-51 (1965).
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One Supreme Court decision has suggested that the courts should
accept the individual's claim of religious belief as prima facie evidence of
that belief. In Thomas v. Review Board,80 the Supreme Court addressed
the problem of discerning a protectible religious belief. Thomas, ajeho-
vah's Witness initially employed to fabricate sheet steel for a variety of
purposes, was transferred into a department that produced solely for the
military. When Thomas discovered the department's sole military pur-
pose, he asked to be transferred or laid off. Management denied both
requests, so Thomas quit and applied for unemployment compensation.
Although the hearing referee found that Thomas quit due to his religious
beliefs, he found that this did not constitute good cause.8'
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Indiana Supreme Court had
improperly relied on facts that Thomas was struggling with his beliefs8 2
and that not all members shared in Thomas' belief.8 3 In addition, the
Court did not believe that the interests advanced by Indiana outweighed
Thomas' free exercise rights.8 4 Based on this analysis, the Court re-
versed the lower court's ruling.8 5
2. Belief that is Sincerely Held
To prevent individuals from abusing the free exercise clause, courts
require the belief to be sincerely held.8 6 The courts cannot require a
claimant to prove the truth of that belief. In United States v. Ballard,8 7 the
Court held that the district court properly withheld the issue of the truth
of the defendant's religious tenets when it only submitted the issue of
"honest and good faith" belief to the jury.88
The Thomas decision, on the other hand, implicates a change in the
first prong, making the sincerity of the belief the primary focus rather
than whether the belief is rooted in religion.8 9 Contrary to Thomas, later
80 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas the Court stated that "the resolution of that question is not to
turn upon ajudicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amend-
ment protection." Id. at 714. See also Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Once
belief is established as sincere, it would seem undisputable that [the claim] must be 'rooted in' that
belief, at least in part."); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 899 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("A religious
belief can appear to every other member of the human race preposterous, yet merit the protections
of the Bill of Rights.").
81 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 712.
82 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715 ("Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because
the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated
with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.").
83 Id. at 716 ("[lt is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether
the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.").
84 Id at 718-19. The state interests advanced were the burden on the fund if personal reasons
allowed people to leave jobs and collect compensation and avoidance of a detailed probing by em-
ployers into an applicant's religious beliefs and practices.
85 Id. at 720.
86 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
87 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
88 In Ballard, respondents were convicted for using and scheming to use the mails to defraud
through means of false representations, pretenses, and promises about the I Am movement (healing
power over incurable diseases). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on grounds other than
truth of the belief. Id. at 88. The Court stated: "Men may believe what they cannot prove. They
may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs." Id at 86.
89 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
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decisions have required the religious belief and practice to be "central"
to that religion in order to merit first amendment protection. 90
3. Burden on Religion
The claimant bears the burden of proving an "infringement," "bur-
den," or "coercive effect," but no formal test for a de minimis burden
exists. 91 Burdens violating the free exercise of religion may either be
direct or indirect.92 In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that the burden
or infringement on the religious practice need not rise to the level of
prohibition; merely impeding the exercise will suffice. 93 As the Supreme
Court stated in Braunfeld v. Brown,94 "if the purpose or effect of a law is to
impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidi-
ously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect." 95
4. Centrality
The courts have used various terms, such as central religious con-
cepts,96 "cardinal principle,"'97 and "integrally related," 98 to describe the
necessary importance of the religious practice to the individual. Profes-
sor Tribe suggests that centrality has always been important in evaluating
free exercise claims.99 Another author has suggested that the distinction
between beliefs and practices finds its rationale in this factor. 00
Whether or not the claimant must assert centrality, it seems apparent
from the case law that the more central a practice is to the religion, the
less likely that a governmental interest will override the claimant's free
90 For the implications of the centrality doctrine to this comment, see infra notes 117-39 and
accompanying text.
91 "While there is no formal test for a de minimis burden, there must be a substantial burden-
that is, one which would inhibit the practice of the religion and, in effect, would constitute coercion
to forego the practice." NowAx, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3D ED. § 17.6 at 1068
(West 1986).
92 Id. at 1068 ("Such burdens may be 'direct' in the sense that an activity essential to the reli-
gious practice is prohibited, or 'indirect' in that the regulation makes the practice of religion more
difficult.").
93 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
94 366 U.S. 599 (1960).
95 Id. at 607. Braunfeld upheld the Blue Laws under the free exercise clause. Braunfeld and
other Orthodox Jewish merchants sought to enjoin the enforcement of these laws which carried a
criminal penalty. Braunfeld argued economic injury; the Court held, however, that providing a uni-
form day of rest outweighed Braunfeld's claim. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. See also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 455 (1961) (upheld the constitutionality of Sunday Blue Closing Laws
under the establishment clause).
96 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
97 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
98 Lakewood, Ohio Cong. ofJehovah's Witnesses v. Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir.) (a
zoning ordinance which forbade the religious sect from building in an all residential area was not
unconstitutional since building a church was not a "fundamental tenet"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815
(1983).
99 TRIBE, supra note 48, § 14-11, at 863. See also infra notes 117-39 and accompanying text.
100 Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point? 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217,274. As
the Supreme Court noted in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940): "[T]he Amend-
ment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in




B. The Second Prong: Compelling State Interest and Least Restrictive Means
Once the infringement on religion has been determined, the individ-
ual asserting his religious rights will prevail unless the government puts
forth a compelling governmental interest. Furthermore, where govern-
mental action interferes with or burdens a fundamental right, the govern-
ment must use the "least restrictive means" to accomplish the com-
pelling state interest. Thus, a compelling governmental interest exists if
no alternative means of regulation would accomplish the governmental
purpose without infringing on the free exercise right.'
0 2
The courts have found compelling governmental interests in the ar-
eas of education, 03 family unity,' 0 4 elimination of discrimination, 0 5
child welfare, 106 Sunday closing laws,1° 7 defense of country, 08 drug reg-
ulation, 0 9 and discipline." 0 Perhaps the Yoder Court best expressed the
magnitude of the governmental interest necessary to outweigh free exer-
cise claims: "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion."'''
101 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir.
1984), aff'd sub nom., Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985); Windsor Park Baptist Church v.
Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 658 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1981).
102 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
103 Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that aJehovah's Witness, a
teacher in the public school system, could not disregard a prescribed school curriculum of civics
because of her beliefs since a state's interest in good citizens is paramount), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1026 (1980).
104 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (the Court upheld a law prohibiting
polygamy even as applied to a Mormon whose religion required him to engage in this practice).
105 E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (health insurance pro-
vided only to heads of the household discriminated even though based in the Bible); Wilmington
Christian School v. Board of Educ., 545 F. Supp. 440 (D. Del. 1982) (refusal to sell public facilities to
a private school justified by purpose of integration); and Bob Jones Univ. v.Johnson, 396 F. Supp.
597 (D.S.C. 1974) (belief against interracial dating causing the expulsion of violators is discrimina-
tory), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
106 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state can prevent children from working
although religion has tenet of proselytizing).
107 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday Blue Laws, though causing economic injury
to practice of observing Sabbath on Saturday, justified by providing uniform day of rest). See also
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
108 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (defense of country overrides conscientious
objection to a particular war).
109 United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1982) (conviction for possession and
importation of marijuana upheld against a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church even
though marijuana is essential to religious practice), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). See also, Native
American Church v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir.
1980); Randall v. Wyrick, 441 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Mo. 1977); and United States v. Kuch, 288 F.
Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968). But see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 889, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964).
110 Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir.) (female guard could frisk Islamic prisoner even
though his religion commands that only his mother and wife could touch him), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
996 (1983); Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974) (school could enforce short hair length
rules on Indian student); and Marshall v. District of Columbia, 392 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1975)
(governmental interest in portraying groomed police officers).
111 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ("Only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.").
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In addition to showing a "compelling state interest," the Court re-
quires the government to proceed with the "least restrictive" means
available to serve that interest. 112 The purpose of this additional re-
quirement comports with the practice of protecting fundamental rights
and maintaining government neutrality without offending the establish-
ment clause.
III. Free Exercise Law in Indian Claims Regarding Public Lands
In the American Indian claims involving religious sites on public
lands, courts have applied the traditional free exercise test.1 3 However,
in evaluating the infringement prong, courts have relied more heavily
upon centrality than in other types of free exercise cases.' 1 4 This devel-
opment has evoked much criticism.1 5 Critics have also attacked judicial
application of the second prong of the balancing test to Indian claims
involving specific religious sites, on the grounds that it does not ade-
quately assess Indian religious claims. 116 The Yoder test, as currently ap-
plied, has impeded Indian free exercise rights on public lands.
A. The Centrality Requirement
In examining Native American free exercise claims involving public
lands under the first prong of the traditional test, courts have empha-
sized that worship at the sites at issue must be central to the religions of
the Indians to warrant enjoining development of that land.
17
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority 18 was the first federal circuit
opinion to evaluate an American Indian free exercise claim involving
public land use. In Sequoyah, the Sixth Circuit required that Natives seek-
ing to enjoin government development of public lands prove that the
lands in question played a central role in their religion. 119 The court
noted that the plaintiffs had a religion within the meaning of the Consti-
tution and did not question the sincerity of their adherence to that reli-
gion.120 The Sixth Circuit then applied the two pronged test and sought
to evaluate "the constitutional validity of a claim based on the Free Exer-
cise Clause."' 121 The court used Yoder and two previous state court deci-
sions involving Indian free exercise claims 122 (although not involving
112 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that
it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."). See also supra note 63
and Church of God v. Amarillo Indep. School Dist., 511 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (school's
policy of limiting the number of excused absences for religious holidays violated free exercise be-
cause the older policy of making up work was less restrictive), aff'd, 670 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1982).
113 See infra notes 118-53 and accompanying text.
114 See infra notes 117-39 and accompanying text.
115 See infra notes 124 & 137 and accompanying text.
116 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
118 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
119 Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164. The plaintiffs, three Cherokee Indians and two Cherokee organi-
zations, sued to enjoin construction of a TVA dam which would flood lands held sacred by the
Cherokees.
120 Id. at 1163.
121 Id. at 1164.
122 Id. at 1164 (citing: Frank v. Alaska, 604 P. 2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (overturned conviction of
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public land use), to formulate a prerequisite to relief. The court held
that those seeking to impede government action must prove that the reli-
gious practices or beliefs allegedly burdened occupy a position of "cen-
trality or indispensability" in their religion.1 23 The court concluded that
the plaintiffs had "fallen short" of demonstrating that worship at the sites
to be flooded was indispensable or central. 124 Absent this proof, the
court held that "plaintiffs have not alleged infringement of a constitu-
tionally cognizable First Amendment right."'
2 5
In Wilson v. Block, 126 which involved Hopi and Navajo Indian plain-
tiffs, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit relied upon Sequoyah's centrality analysis in evaluating a free exercise
claim. The court held that "plaintiffs seeking to restrict government land
use must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the government's proposed
land use would impair a religious practice that could not be performed at
any other site."' 2 7 The court concluded that Sequoyah's analysis was ap-
propriate solely in cases involving the significance of a geographic site
for religion, 28 and that the plaintiffs had not met Sequoyah's standard. 129
Indian who shot moose out of season because moose was used in religious funeral feast); People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 889, 394 P. 2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Cal. 1964) (overturned conviction of Indian
peyote user because peyote was used in religious ceremony)).
123 Id. at 1164.
124 Id. at 1164. See also Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis.
L. REV. 217, 274-78. The article finds a distinction between those religious claims involving central
religious issues and those involving religious issues on the "periphery" of the claimant's religion.
Galanter, however, concludes that
To determine what is central or essential to all religion would reintroduce the discarded
and unworkable notion that some activities are by nature secular and some religious ....
Just as the religious character of an activity is dependent on a particular religious perspec-
tive, so is its centrality or essentiality.
Id. at 277 (emphasis in original).
For criticism ofSequoyah's stipulation that the Indians had to allege that the religious practices at
issue were "central," see Stambor, Manifest Destiny and Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, Badoni
and the Drowned Gods, 10 AM. IND. L. REV. 59 (1982).
125 Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate "that
worship at the particular location is inseparable from the way of life (Yoder), the cornerstone of their
religious observance (Frank), or plays the central role in their religious ceremonies and practices
(Woody)." Id. at 1164.
126 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
127 Id. at 744 (footnote omitted). Upon review of the plaintiffs' contention that the district court
had erred in applying Sequoyah to the case, the Wilson court distinguished Sequoyah's analysis from
traditional first amendment precepts, holding that religion was not to be judged on the basis of the
theological importance of the activity, and that courts were not to dictate the required aspects of a
religion. The Wilson court held that Sequoyah applied only to Indian free exercise land claims. Id at
743.
The court's limitation of Sequoyah solely to land claims, however, seems puzzling, for Sequoyah
borrowed the terminology of central and indispensable from claims not involving public land use.
128 The plaintiffs argued that Sequoyah did not provide the applicable constitutional standard to
their case, but that Sherbert and Thomas did. The court disagreed, interpreting Sherbert and Thomas to
apply only in cases which considered "whether the government may legally condition benefits on a
decision to forego or adhere to a religious practice." Wilson, 708 F.2d at 743. "Those cases did not
purport to create a benchmark against which to test all indirect burden claims." Id. The court stated
in Wilson that the government had not "conditioned any benefit upon conduct proscribed or man-
dated by the plaintiffs' beliefs." Id. at 741.
The Wilson court cited, inter alia, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Geller v. Secretary
of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1976); and Unitarian Church W. v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp.
1252 (E.D. Wis. 1972), aft'd, 474 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 416
U.S. 936 (1974) to support the principle that courts should avoid judicial evaluations ofthe religious
significance of religious practices and beliefs.
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This centrality requirement has been applied in most cases130 involv-
ing Indian religious practice at sites on public lands.13' Some authorities
claim that the centrality requirement comes from a questionable reading
of precedent, 132 that it is inconsistent with non-Indian religious cases,'
33
and is also inconsistent when compared with nonpublic land Indian free
exercise claims.' 34 However, the centrality modification upon the Yoder
test appears solidly entrenched in Native American claims involving pub-
129 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 745.
130 The only case not to apply a centrality analysis in an Indian free exercise claim was Badoni v.
Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), aft'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981) (applied the traditional two-pronged test and held that the plaintiffs' allegations did
not constitute a cognizable first amendment claim). See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
131 See United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985) (centrality applied in holding that
denial of a special use permit for access to religious sites in the Black Hills National Forest, under
then current Forest Service procedures, violated free exercise rights); Inupiat Community of Arctic
Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), aft'd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 68 (1985) (Sequoyah cited in denying Inupiat Eskimos an injunction of government
development of ice-covered waters in the Arctic Ocean, which would have allegedly destroyed a
sacred area, although the court did not explicitly apply a centrality analysis); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F.
Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aft'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (centrality
applied to alleged free exercise infringements regarding government projects to improve public ac-
cess to a sacred geological formation; injunction of further development denied).
The Means court held that, after determining centrality, three factors must be weighed in decid-
ing "whether a neutrally based rule violates the free exercise clause." 627 F. Supp. at 258. The
factors were "(1) the magnitude of the rule's impact upon the the exercise of the religious belief, (2)
the existence of a compelling governmental interest justifying the burden imposed upon such exer-
cise, and (3) the extent to which recognizing an exemption would impede governmental objectives
sought to be advanced." Id. See also E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.
1982) ( E.E.O.C. action involving wage discrimination and retaliatory discharge allegations, both
relating to religious beliefs).
132 See Stambor, supra note 124, at 68.
[T]he [Sequoyah] court relied on language in Yoder and two state cases, Frank v. Alaska and
People v. Woody, to support its thesis that even if plaintiffs' claims were religious, they were
not entitled to free exercise protection unless the disputed practices were central to the
religion. None of the cases, however, provides solid authority for the court's 'centrality'
test.
133 See Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development: A New Breed of Religion Cases, 1984 UTAH L.
REv. 313, 328-29.
134 Many courts have not applied Sequoyah's explicit centrality analysis in non-public land Indian
free exercise claims. Cases decided after the Wilson decision have been consistent with Wilson's re-
striction of the centrality analysis to land claims. See, e.g., Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357, 360 (8th
Cir. 1975) (Indian prisoner did not have to prove that long hair, in contravention of prison regula-
tions, was "an absolute tenet of the Indian religion") (footnote omitted); United States v. Abeyta,
632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986) (Indian who killed eagle for religious purpose not subjected to
centrality analysis); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Clark, 593 F. Supp. 257 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (Indian
not subjected to centrality analysis in her allegation that adherence to religious practices prevented
timely filing of an affidavit); Cole v. Fulcomer, 588 F. Supp. 772 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (hair length in
prison; no centrality), rev'd on other grounds, 758 F.2d 124 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 253 (1985);
Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 516 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1981) (hair length in prison; no centrality), aff'd,
670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982); State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P. 2d 950 (1973) (did not
require centrality to reverse convictions of Native American Church members who used peyote), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); Solomon v. Coughlin, 456 N.Y.S. 2d 125, 89 App. Div. 2d 1045 (1982)
(Indian protesting prison directive requiring cutting the hair of all new inmates; centrality not ap-
plied in denying claim); Whitehom v. State, 561 P. 2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (centrality not
explicitly required in peyote case); Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986)
(Indian drug counselor discharged for taking sacramental peyote; centrality not applied); Black v.
Employment Div., 301 Or. 221, 721 P.2d 451 (1986) (no explicit centrality analysis in evaluating
discharge of Indian drug counselor for taking sacramental peyote); State v. Brave Heart, 326 N.W.
2d 220, 222 (S.D. 1982) (Indians attempted to prove that burning an open fire in forest preserve was
an "essential" part of their religion; court denied first amendment defense on grounds the Indians
failed to allege that enforcement of statute at issue denied them a free exercise right), dismissed, 460
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lic lands. Courts may well have undertaken a centrality analysis without
making the issue a requirement for a cognizable claim in evaluating
claims stemming from traditionally recognized Western religions. 135 Ar-
guably, when courts deal with religions outside the scope of a Judeo-
Christian conception of religious belief the inquiry may properly become
explicit. However, the centrality or indispensability requirement for Na-
tive claims may be an inappropriate inquiry because it applies a concept
apparently drawn from Western religions to religions that may not have a
comparable "center."' 3 6 Additionally, authorities have suggested that
the centrality analysis must necessarily be subjective, perhaps to the
point of being an undesirable judicial inquiry.1
3 7
The centrality requirement applies only after the claim has been
identified as "rooted in religion." Therefore, courts have entertained
the notion that Indian beliefs are cognizable under the first amendment
to some extent, as demonstrated by their application of the centrality
analysis in the first place.13 8 The burden of proving centrality, however,
weighs heavily on the plaintiff. Failure to meet this requirement has
U.S. 1064 (1983). But see Frank and Woody, supra note 122, which courts have interpreted to require
an explicit centrality analysis.
The judicial discussions of centrality appear to suggest centrality is not required for relief.
Rather, courts seem to emphasize that the religious practice or belief at issue be connected to a bona
fide religion. The centrality language of Whitehorn v. State, 561 P. 2d 539, 547 (Okla. Crim. App.
1977) is illustrative: "[U]se of peyote by the Native American Church is an intricate part of their
constitutionally protected religious beliefs and therefore should be protected from governmental
interference."
135 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrtmoAL LAW § 14-11 at 863 (1978). Professor Tribe has ob-
served that "in one sense the factor of centrality has always been important to the free exercise
clause .... The belief-action distinction, it has been suggested, was partly an implicit affirmation
that it was belief, prayer, and worship which comprised the central and essential core of religion."
Id (citing Galanter, supra note 124, at 274).
For an example of centrality applied implicitly, see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (declares that the
beliefs and practices were "inseparable" from the Amish way of life, but does not require them to be
so to qualify for relief).
136 See Pemberton, "I Saw That it Was Holy": The Black Hills and the Concept of Sacred Land, 3 Aw &
INEQUALrTY 287, 290-97 (1985); Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public
Lands, 94 YALE LJ. 1447, 1471 (1985) (to effectuate first amendment protection of religion, judicial
system must analyze free exercise in the context of the particular religion).
137 Galanter, supra note 124 at 277 ("To determine what is central or essential to all religion
would reintroduce the discarded and unworkable notion that some activities are by nature secular
and some religious. Depending upon one's point of view, virtually any activity can be religious. .
(emphasis in original).
138 Cf Congress has passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), Pub. L. 95-341
§ 1, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996 (1981)), which provides:
On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exer-
cise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians,
including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the
freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
The Act was initially regarded as a major step forward in enabling Indians to get redress for
their injuries. See, e.g., Note, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 429 (1983);
Note, The First Amendment and Indian Religious Claims: An Approach to Protecting Native American Religion,
71 IowA L. REv. 869 (1986); Note, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act- An Answer to the Indian's
Prayers? 29 S.D.L. REv. 131 (1983).
Some district courts, however, have held that AIRFA did not create any cause of action for
Indians beyond those already recognized under the first amendment. See Crow v. Gullet, 541 F.
Supp. 785, 793-94 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983);
Hopi v. Block, 8 Indian L. Rep. 3073, 3076 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'dsub. nom., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d
735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). See also Michaelsen, American Indian Religious Freedom
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spelled defeat for the majority of Indian public land claims.13 9
B. Yoder's Second Prong: The Role of Compelling Government Interests in
Indian Free Exercise Claims Involving Public Land Use
Few courts have reached the second prong in an Indian public land
context. This can be attributed in part to the stringent centrality require-
ment applied to these cases. Those Native American claims reaching the
second prong have not fared well when balanced against government in-
terests, even though recognized as protectible rights under the first
prong.
In Badoni v. Higginson,140 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit examined a Navajo claim seeking to enjoin the government
from continually flooding the base of the Rainbow Bridge National Mon-
ument.14' The district court found that the plaintiffs had not made a
cognizable first amendment claim 142 and granted summary judgment for
the government. The circuit court accepted, for the purposes of the pro-
ceeding, the premise that the government had infringed upon plaintiffs'
first amendment rights. 143 In exploring the second prong, the court con-
cluded that the government's interest in maintaining Lake Powell at a
level that intruded into the monument outweighed the religious interests
of the Indians, 144 for the Lake was an important part of a multi-state
water storage and power generation project.
In Crow v. Gullet,' 45 the United States District Court for South Da-
kota held that government projects undertaken to improve public access
to a geological formation held sacred by Indians did not constitute an
infringement of a cognizable first amendment right. 146 However, the
court nevertheless examined plaintiffs' allegation that the temporary
closing to overnight camping of an area traditionally used by the plain-
tiffs for religious purposes unduly burdened their religious practices.'
47
The court proceeded to apply the second prong and held that excluding
people from the site was the least restrictive means 148 of accomplishing
compelling state interests in management of the park where the monu-
ment was located.149
Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3J. L. & REL. 47, 52 (1983) (argues that AIRFA is "basically a toothless
congressional resolution").
139 See Wilson, supra note 126; Sequoyah, supra note 118; Inupiat, supra note 131; Crow, supra note
131.
140 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
141 The government had flooded the monument's base though maintenance of Lake Powell, a
reservoir created and regulated by a dam, allegedly damaging Indian sacred sites near the Rainbow
Bridge.
142 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977).
143 The circuit court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Badoni, 638 F.2d
at 177.
144 Id.
145 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aft'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
146 Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 794.
147 Id. at 791.
148 Id. at 792. The access facility projects complained of included construction of roads, bridges,
and parking lots.
149 The state interests the court identified were "in preserving the environment and the resource
[the geological formation] from further decay, in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of park
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The holdings in Badoni and Crow indicate that cognizable site-specific
Native free exercise claims bear an extreme burden in overwhelming
government interests in use, management, or development of public
lands. One court has regarded the concept of restricting government
conduct with public land on free exercise grounds as troublesome. 50 A
court must decide why some, through means designed to protect their
religion, may restrict uses of lands held by the government for the bene-
fit of many.' 5 ' Although Indian plaintiffs trying to win a free exercise
claim involving public land use bear a difficult burden, some hope
remains.
In United States v. Means,' 52 the district court found that the removal
of 800 acres from the Black Hills National Forest, for Native American
religious purposes, was a necessary accommodation under the free exer-
cise clause because the government could not establish a compelling in-
terest to counterbalance the Indians' cognizable free exercise rights in
the land. 53
IV. Analysis of the Peterson Decision
In affirming the district court's injunction, the Ninth Circuit became
the first to find in favor of the Indians in a land-based free exercise claim
at the circuit court level.' 54 While the result is sound, the court makes
assumptions concerning the components of the two prong balancing test
which may be invalid.
The requirement that the Natives prove that the high country is "in-
dispensable and central to their religious practices and beliefs"' 55 stems
from a questionable reading of precedent. While in Sherbert, the Court
termed the burdened religious belief as a "cardinal principle of her reli-
gious faith,"' 56 and the belief held by the Amish in Yoder as "firmly
visitors, and in improving public access to this unique geological and historical landmark." Id. at
794.
150 See Badoni, 455 F. Supp. at 645 ("To hold that a person may assert First Amendment rights to
the disruption of property rights by others, even if that other person is a government, could and
likely would lead to unauthorized and troublesome results.").
151 See Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791 ("[Ihe free exercise clause places a duty upon a state to keep
from prohibiting religious acts, not to provide the means or environment for carrying them out.").
See also Clark v. Wolff, 347 F. Supp. 887 (D. Neb.) (dietary rights of Black Muslim prisoners did not
require that prison affirmatively provide for religious demands to avoid a free exercise violation),
aff'd, 468 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1972).
152 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985).
153 Id. at 264. The court granted the Indians a special use permit in view of Chess v. Widmar, 635
F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980) (mutual accommodation of some student groups required by the free
exercise clause did not violate establishment clause), aff'd sub. nom., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981), and O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (allowed PopeJohn Paul II to say mass
in national park as a lawful accommodation of the free exercise clause that did not violate establish-
ment clause).
154 For cases wherein the courts' holdings favored the government, see Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d
735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text; Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785
(D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text; Badoni
v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text; and Se-
quoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), supra notes 118-25 and accompa-
nying text.
155 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693. See supra note 26.
156 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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grounded in... central religious concepts,"' 57 the Court in Thomas did
not apply the same amount of scrutiny to the free exercise claim. In ap-
plying the Yoder test, the Court found Thomas' beliefs to be burdened,
despite the fact that Thomas was "struggling" with those beliefs and the
beliefs were not shared by all members of Thomas' religious sect.
158
One reading of Thomas suggests that the question should not be
whether the religious belief in question is central, but rather whether that
belief is sincerely held. This would relax somewhat the centrality re-
quirements developed in Sequoyah for public land cases. Not all courts
have agreed. In Wilson, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit distin-
guished the relaxed requirements of Thomas. 159 The Wilson court said the
applicable standard was set forth in Sequoyah.16° The Sequoyah standard
requires those claiming a burden on their free exercise rights by virtue of
the government's use or control of public land to demonstrate that the
land at issue is indispensable to some religious practice, and that no
other site would provide an effective substitute. 161
This argument defies logic. Sequoyah purported to derive its two step
analysis, including the centrality requirement, from Sherbert and Yoder.1
62
Thomas modified the Yoder analysis by making the threshold test one of
sincerity of belief rather than centrality of belief. 63 Thomas should,
therefore, modify that portion of the Sequoyah test purportedly based on
Sherbert and Yoder. The foundation upon which the test in Sequoyah rests
shifted in Thomas; the Sequoyah test likewise should reflect that shift lest it
lose support entirely.
The lack of application of centrality analysis to free exercise claims
which do not involve government controlled public lands further weak-
ens its application. In cases seeking restoration of governmental benefits
denied due to religious-based non-compliance with governmental re-
quirements, the standard becomes one of sincerity of belief.'64 Cases
which seek exemptions from governmental rules or other affirmative reg-
ulations do not require a finding of centrality before granting the exemp-
tion.1 65 Native American free exercise claims which involve other
157 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
158 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
159 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 743 ("Sherbert and Thomas considered only whether the government may
legally condition benefits on a decision to forego or to adhere to religious belief or practice. Those
cases did not purport to create a benchmark against which to test all indirect burden claims.").
160 See Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
161 The Court also required the beliefs in question to be "rooted in religion" in order to be
protected by the free exercise clause. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713.
162 See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
163 In U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Supreme Court considered a free exercise case which
concerned payment of social security taxes by an Amish employer on behalf of his Amish employees.
The employer argued that the exemption from the tax payment requirement given Amish self-em-
ployed workers should be extended to cover Amish employees. The Court accepted that Lee's reli-
gious beliefs objecting to payment of such taxes were sincerely held. Id. at 257. The Court quoted
Thomas to support its view that it is not the place of the courts to determine the proper interpretation
of a person's faith. Id.
In Yoder, sincerity was not at issue because the State stipulated that the Yoder's religious beliefs
were sincerely held. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
164 See Lee, 455 U.S. at 257, and Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209, supra note 163.
165 The court in Woody found that the use of peyote was the "theological heart" of Peyotism. 61
Cal. 2d at 722, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 394 P.2d at 818. The court nowhere implied that such a finding
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disputes with the government, such as the right to use an otherwise ille-
gal drug in a religious service, do not hinge on a finding of centrality.
166
Courts appear to have singled out Indian free exercise land use
claims for application of the centrality requirement. This treatment re-
suits directly from the Sequoyah decision, a questionable standard when
announced, which is even more questionable in light of Thomas. Courts
should reconsider the requirement that an Indian religious land claim be
indispensable and central to Indian religious beliefs following the
Supreme Court's decision in Thomas v. Review Board. This would perhaps
serve to even out any subliminal prejudices held against Native religions
by courts more familiar with Judeo-Christian religious traditions.
167
Peterson found in favor of the Indians, not because of any change in
the application of the test taken from Wilson and Sequoyah, but because a
strong claim held by the Indians to the high country outweighed the rela-
tively weak governmental interests at stake. No multimillion dollar dam
already stood as in Sequoyah and Badoni; no existing ski area operated as
in Wilson. Instead, the government sought access to a comparatively fun-
gible resource, timber, the harvesting of which the district court found
"would not significantly affect timber supplies."' 68 The Indian free exer-
cise claim balanced against this interest survived application of even the
rigorous Wilson-Sequoyah test. As the circuit court stated in Peterson, how-
ever, when it distinguished the case at bar from previous unsuccesful In-
dian land-claim cases, "[i]nherent in the adoption of a balancing test is
the distinct possibility that, on a different record, the Indians may
prevail." 6 9
The question remains whether Peterson reflects a breakthrough for
Indian religious land claims, or merely reflects a fortuitous set of facts
applied to a difficult balancing test. The answer depends on future
courts' recognition of the significance of the Thomas decision. Absent
such recognition, future Indian claims will probably go the way of Se-
quoyah and Badoni: to a "watery grave."
V. Conclusion
Peterson represents the first United States Court of Appeals decision
was any sort of threshold requirement in order for a religious claim to be protected by the free
exercise clause. See also In Re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 877, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 394 P.2d 728 (1964), decided
the same day as Woody, wherein the court annulled the conviction of a "self-styled preacher" for
possession of peyote. A new trial was granted, since "[u]nlike the situation in Woody ... the defend-
ant here has not proved that his asserted belief was an honest and bona fide one." 61 Cal. 2d at 888,
39 Cal. Rptr. at 913, 394 P.2d at 729. The absence of a centrality requirement in the California
Supreme Court's own interpretation of its holding in Woody suggests that centrality is not the key to
the free exercise analysis. While the peyote may have been central to the Indian's religious beliefs in
Woody, it is by no means clear that centrality was required.
166 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
167 See Stambor, supra notes 124 & 132 and accompanying text.
This subliminal prejudice may exist because of the differing orientations between most Indian
and traditional (Judeo-Christian) religions. See, e.g., Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development: A
New Breed of Religion Cases, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 313, 319-320; Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Govern-
mental Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE UJ. 1447, 1451 (1985).
168 Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 596. "Moreover, the regional timber industry will not suffer greatly
without access to timber in the Unit." Id.
169 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 695.
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to hold that governmental interests did not override Indian free exercise
rights in a case which involved the development of public land at Indian
religious sites. Despite the novelty of the Peterson holding, the court's
analysis followed the analysis of previous Indian free exercise claims in
which the Indians' interests did not prevail. Because most Indian reli-
gions have been found worthy of first amendment protection, there is no
need for such a strict application of the centrality requirement. The Pe-
terson analysis still reflects too much emphasis on the importance of the
centrality test to free exercise claims, especially Indian free exercise
claims. Indians' religious interests will benefit from this decision only if
courts follow the Peterson holding in conjunction with a more relaxed def-
inition of a protectible religious practice, such as that advanced in Thomas
v. Review Board.
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